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Correspondence versus Autonomy in
the Language of Understanding
Human Action
Kenneth J. Gergen

Some years ago, I became absorbed with the problem of historicity
in human action. There seemed good reason to contend that pat
terns of human conduct are subject to continuous alteration across
time. If this assumption is justified, certain limits seemed to be
placed over the capacity of the sociobehavioral sciences to accumu
late knowledge in the traditional sense (Gergen 1973, 1978a, 1982).
Although continued attention to this problem is surely warranted
(see especially chaps. 2 and 4, this volume), it is to another related
set of issues that I shall address my remarks. During the course of
studying the historicity problem, I became increasingly struck with
what appeared to be a very loose relationship between language
and the patterns of conduct to which language ostensibly refers.
Commonly we take the language of social description to stand in
some roughly correspondent relationship to discriminable patterns
of action. Thus, whether in science or daily life, description is as
sumed to be informative about actions independent of it. Yet com
mon experience provides numerous instances in which such
assumptions are contradicted. For example, an individual might be
described as “intelligent,” “warm,” or “depressed,” and all the
while his bodily movements are undergoing continuous alteration.
His actions are protean, elastic, multiplicitous, but the description
remains static. Similar discrepancies can be discerned on the pro
fessional level. In psychoanalysis, for example, practitioners dem
onstrate an uncanny ability to apply a restricted descriptive
vocabulary to an immense range of life patterns. Regardless of the
vicissitudes of one’s life trajectory, for analytic purposes, it can be
characterized by a relatively narrow range of descriptors. If one
turns to the psychological laboratory, one continues to find investi
gators capable of retaining a given theoretical account regardless of
136
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the range of data brought to bear. I can think of no psychological
theory that has yet been abandoned for reasons of clear observa
tional challenge.
The concern of this chapter, then, is the problem of the rela
tionship between descriptive language and the world it is designed
to represent. The problem is of no small consequence, for as phi
losophers of science have long been aware, it is primarily in the
degree to which there is correspondence between theoretical lan
guage and real-world events that scientific theory acquires utility in
the market of prediction and control. If scientific language bears
no determinate relationship to events external to the language it
self, not only does its contribution to prediction and control be
come problematic, but scientific theory becomes closed to
improvement through observation. The hope that knowledge may
be advanced through continued, systematic observation is ren
dered problematic. More generally, one would be moved to ques
tion the fundamental objectivity of scientific accounts. If such
accounts are not grounded in observation, then what furnishes
their warrant? The question is critical as it is this claim to objectivity
that has furnished the chief basis for the broad authority claimed
by the sciences over the past century.
It is in these many respects that early philosophers of science
have been keen to establish a close relationship between language
and observation. At the heart of the logical positivist movement,
for example, lay the “verifiability principle of meaning”; to wit, the
meaning of a proposition rests on its capacity for verification
through observation. As it was argued, propositions not open to
corroboration or emendation through observation are unworthy of
further disputation. The problem was, however, to account for the
connection between propositions and observations. Schlick (1934)
argued that the meaning of single words within propositions must
be established through ostensive (“pointing to”) means. In his early
work, Carnap (1928) proposed that thing-predicates represented
“primitive ideas,” thus reducing scientific propositions to reports
of private experience. For Neurath (1932), propositions were to be
verified though “protocol sentences,” which were themselves to re
fer to the biological processes of perception. As all such statements
are thus reducible to the language of physics, Neurath argued,
there was a fundamental unity among all branches of science. From
yet another vantage point, Russell (1924) proposed that objective
knowledge could be reduced to sets of “atomic propositions,” the
truth of which would rest on isolated and discriminable facts.
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Yet such attempts to establish secure and determinate rela
tionships between words and real-world referents eventually came
under heavy attack. Were the propositions entering into the ver
ifiability principle themselves subject to verification? If not, in what
sense were they meaningful? Propositions appear to have meaning
over and above the referential capacity of the words that make
them up. How is such meaning to be understood? Are propositions
subject to verification, or only single terms? Is verification a state of
mind, and if so, in what sense are states of mind themselves verifia
ble? On what grounds are the basic facts to which descriptors refer
to be established? How can rules for linking predicates with partic
ulars be constructed when the terms of the rules themselves remain
meaningless until defined by further linking rules? These and
other nettlesome questions have remained recalcitrant to a broadly
compelling solution. Today it is generally agreed that the manner
in which objectivity in meaning is achieved, along with a specifica
tion of the rules for when it is not, remains unsatisfactorily explica
ted (cf. Fuller 1983; Barnes 1982).
At the same time, other lines of argumentation have been
emerging, the implications of which are substantial. In each of
these cases, a significant question has been raised concerning the
relationship between word and object, or theory and evidence. In
each case, the arguments grant such substantial autonomy to the
oretical discourse that major revisions seem demanded in the tradi
tional account of science. Certain of these arguments are of
particular significance to the formulation of metatheory for the
sociobehavioral sciences. They emerge from differing (although
sometimes congenial) intellectual contexts, and their contours are
not always distinguishable. Thus I will initially attempt to bring
four of these positions into clear focus. After examining the im
plications of these arguments for the sciences more generally, we
can move to consider a variety of major functions to be fulfilled by
theories of human action.
The Contextual Dependency of Meaning

The initial line of argument is one that has wended its way through
several philosophic debates and has subsequently had a marked
impact on microsociological thought. As we have seen from the
logical empiricist perspective, critical descriptive terms at the the
oretical level should correspond to specifiable or delimited obser
vations. The ideal situation would be one in which discrete
particulars at the level of observation would stand in a one-to-one
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relationship with mathematical integers at the theoretical level.
The attempt of correspondence theorists is thus to establish foun
dations of knowledge that are context free. That is, the linkage
between theoretical terms and observations (or the objective mean
ing of propositions) should remain stable across varying contexts
both at the theoretical and at the observational level. If context
invariance is not maintained, then the potential for scientific prog
nostication is severely threatened; one would be unable to specify
what facts would be predicted by the theory as theoretical and his
torical contexts were altered. The possibility for empirical test is
further impugned because one would be unable to specify what
observations would count as confirmations or disconflrmations of a
theory across varying contexts.
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations was one of the first sig
nificant works to challenge the possibility for context-free corre
spondence. As he proposed, the meaning of words (or sentences) is
achieved through their use in the carrying out of various life forms.
Such uses may be viewed as so many language games, each subject
to its own particular rules. The precise boundaries of the rules can
not be explicated, as the terms of explication will themselves be
context (or “use”) dependent. “There are countless . . . different
kinds of use of what we call ‘symbols,’ ‘words,’ ‘sentences.’ And this
multiplicity is not something fixed, given once and for all; but new
types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into
existence, and these become obsolete and get forgotten” (1963,
11^). Essentially this means that any scientific term derives its
meaning from its context of usage, which can also include the syn
tactic conventions governing its use. To illustrate, in the case of
psychology, a term like “aggression” derives its meaning from the
many contexts in which it is employed. There are also many differ
ent contexts of usage, thus giving the term a far different meaning
depending on whether one is speaking about soldiers at war, tennis
players, investment policies, woodchopping, or weed growth in the
spring. To specify the conditions of use in any precise way is also
problematic, as the terms of specification are themselves embedded
in differing word games. In effect, anything said about aggression,
or any other phenomenon, cannot be cut away from the historically
situated context of concept usage.
Wittgenstein’s doubts concerning the capacity of language to
render context-free description are extended in the work of Quine
(1951, 1960). As Quine demonstrates, the attempt to define even a
single word in terms of empirical referent is problematic. In partic-
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ular, the contexts in which single terms are employed are apt to be
so many and varied that there is no strictly ostensive means of se
curing word-object identities. The term “rabbit,” for example, may
figure in many different linguistic, social, and environmental con
texts. As a result, it is virtually impossible to determine through
observation the truth value of propositions containing the term.
There simply is no stimulus event (or class of events) to which the
term is unambiguously wedded.
Concern with the contextual dependency of “what is true” has
also reverberated throughout the social sciences. One of the most
significant manifestations is reflected in the ethnomethodological
movement (see especially Garfinkel 1967). As ethnomethodologists
maintain, descriptive terms within both the sciences and everyday
life are fundamentally indexical; that is, their meaning is free to
vary across divergent contexts of usage. Descriptions index events
within situations and are devoid of generalized meaning. The es
sential defeasibility of descriptive terms is demonstrated by wideranging studies of how people go about determining in various
situations what counts as a psychiatric problem or as suicide, juve
nile crime, gender, states of mind, alcoholism, mental illness, or
other putative constituents of the taken-for-granted world (see
Garfinkel 1967; Atkinson 1977; Gicourel 1968; Kessler & McKen
na 1978; Coulter 1979; McAndrew 1969; Scheff 1966).
When writ large, the contextualist arguments suggest that de
scriptive and explanatory schemas within the sciences remain mute
with respect to prediction and empirical evaluation until linked to
referents. However, rules as to how such linkages are to be con
structed are generally unexplicated (and indeed there are prin
cipled impediments to establishing such rules). Thus descriptive
and explanatory constructions are fundamentally free to vary in
their empirical content or implications across context of usage. By
extension, this is to say that any behavioral theory may in principle
be applied to (used to describe or explain) virtually any human
action. The constraints over such application lie chiefly within the
social process through which contextual linkages are forged. Thus
almost any theory (Freudian, Skinnerian, social learning, role-rule,
cognitive) should be capable of absorbing all empirical outcomes so
long as there are communities of scholars capable of negotiating
the meaning of theoretical terms across divergent context.
The Social Construction of Reality

In the preceding discussion, the semantic link between word and
object was weakened by taking into account the contextual depen-
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dency of linking practices. A second threat to incorrigibility of
meaning has been nurtured in different soil, namely, that of ra
tionalist and idealist philosophy. Debate over the origin of abstract
ideas has had a long and vigorous history. Empiricists such as
Locke, Hume, and the Mills have argued, on the one hand, that
such ideas are derived from sensory input, while on the other, ra
tionalist/idealist thinkers such as Kant, Spinoza, Schopenhauer,
and Nietzsche have demonstrated the manifold weaknesses in such
a position. As they proposed in various ways, the mind functions as
a generative source of ideas. In effect, the mind generates the con
ceptual basis for interpreting and understanding (and some will
argue, perceiving) the world. The implications of this latter posi
tion for a theory of meaning, or semantic linkages, are far-reach
ing. To the extent that the mind furnishes the categories of
understanding, there are no real-world objects of study other than
those inherent within the mental makeup of persons. There are no
objects save those for which there are preceding categories. The
result is that semantic linkages do not derive from a conjoining of
independent realms—object and category—tied through linking
definitions. Rather, in the act of comprehension, object and con
cept are one; objects reduce to the mental a priori.
In the present century, this tradition has manifested itself in nu
merous ways. Several are especially pertinent to our proceedings.
First, within the philosophy of science, the reduction of object to
percept occurs, though in muted form, in Kuhn’s influential work
(1970). In his most radical moments, Kuhn raises serious doubts
over the cumulativeness of scientific knowledge. Scientific anoma
lies are not generally viewed by Kuhn as contradictions to the as
sumptions of normal science. Rather, they are orthogonal to it.
Thus when a new theory is articulated to render the anomalies
coherent, this theory is not so much an improvement over the old
as it is essentially a different theory, designed to account for differ
ent data, to ask different questions. As Kuhn argues, scientific rev
olutions are akin to “Gestalt shifts”; one simply sees the world
through a different theoretical lens. Kuhn’s closet rationalism gives
way to a more complete assault in Hanson’s widely credited Patterns
of Discovery (1958). As Hanson proposes, what we take to be ele
mentary facts (observables) are determined in significant degree by
the conceptual systems we bring to bear upon them. Visual experi
ence is a product of conceptual or theoretical invention.
The infant and the layman can see—they are not blind. But they
cannot see what the physicist sees; they are blind to what he sees.
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We may not hear that the oboe is out of tune, though this will be
painfully obvious to the trained musician. . . . The element of the
visitor’s visual field, though identical with those of the physicist, are
not organized for him as for the physicist; the same lines, colours,
shapes are apprehended by both, but not in the same way. (Hanson
1958, 17)

Just as contextualism as a philosophic orientation is reflected in
substantive inquiry.in the social sciences, the rationalist orientation
has also manifested itself in a variety of important ways. Highly
influential has been the social phenomenology of Alfred Schutz
(1962—66). As Schutz maintained, understanding of others is pred
icated upon a system of preconceptualization: “I bring into each
concrete situation a stock of preconstructed knowledge which in
cludes networks of typifications of human individuals in general,
typical human motivations, goals, and action patterns” (1964, 29).
Thus the identification of others’ actions is essentially prefigured.
For Schutz, as well as for Kuhn and Hanson, the assumption is
implicit but incompletely elaborated that such prefigurations are
derived from social interchange. This assumption is a pivotal one
in that it enables the thorny problem of innate ideas to be avoided.
The view that people bring to situations cognitive sets, frameworks,
or orientations that are genetically rather than environmentally in
duced has had a long and rather unpleasant intellectual history. To
lodge the frameworks of social understanding within social process
largely insulates against the accumulated criticism. It is the social
basis of the phenomenological fixing that comes to play a critical
role in the broadly influential work of Berger and Luckmann
(1966). As they reason, Schutz’s work forms the basis for a so
ciology of knowledge concerned with the ways in which knowledge
both emerges from and serves to order social process. The indi
vidual “internalizes” the objective order and typically employs such
internalized representations to recreate the social order.
This form of social constructionism is broadly apparent in re
cent social psychological writings. For example, extending Schachter’s labeling theory of emotions (1964) in a sophisticated and
compelling way is the work of Averill (1983) on the social construc
tion of anger. Here anger is removed from psychology as an object
of study. There is no independent process to be interrogated.
Rather, there are historically contingent, culturally specific con
structions of emotional worlds. In a similar vein, Sabini and Silver
(1982) have discussed in piquant detail the ways by which people
determine what counts in social life as envy, flirtation, anger, and
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the like. Inquiry has also been opened on the social functions of
causal accounting in human affairs (Harre 1981; Lalljee 1981;
Gergen & Gergen 1982). Mummendey and her colleagues (1982)
have attempted to demonstrate how aggression is not a fact in
nature but a label used by people for social purposes. Similar argu
ments have been mounted in the case of the self (Gergen 1977).
The implications of this orientation for science become more fully
explicated in the work of Latour and Woolgar (1979) on the social
construction of scientific facts. They undertake a close examination
of the various social “microprocesses” through which biological re
searchers attempt to generate incorrigible facts from manifest
disorder.
As we see, although the intellectual origins differ, both the contexualist and the constructionist reach similar conclusions. Social
actions, as matters of common concern, owe their existence to the
social process whereby meanings are generated and events indexed
by these meanings. There are no independently identifiable, realworld referents to which the language of social description is
cemented.
Deconstructionism and the Figurative Basis
OF Human Understanding

As we have seen, the contextualist approach emphasizes the situa
tional dependence of meaning, while the constructionist emphasizes
the social origins of meaning within situations. In both cases howev
er, the deployment of a descriptive term is determined less by the
features of the object, action, or event to be described than it is by
extraneous processes. A third line of argument threatens the em
pirical dependence of theoretical description in an entirely different
way. Rather than directly challenging the connection between theo
ry and event, the attempt has been to demonstrate how much what is
communicated about events is determined, not by the character of
events themselves, but by linguistic figures or forms. To the extent
that description and explanation are dependent on such figures or
forms, what science tells us about the “thing in itself’ is rendered
suspect. Although the threat to the semantic link is thus an indirect
one, the implications for correspondence assumptions are nev
ertheless powerful.
To appreciate more fully the force of this line of argument, one
must take into account the structuralist movement, to which de
constructionism is largely a response. Structuralism as an intellec
tual endeavor has largely been given to a dualistic conception of
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communicative acts, one that discriminates between surface actions
and underlying meaning. Following Saussure’s distinction (1959)
between the “signifier” (or word) and the “signified” (or the under
lying concept the word represents), it is assumed that the sprawl
ing, ephemeral, and variegated acts of communication may be
expressions of more fundamental, structured sets of principles, di
mensions, conceptual templates, or the like. A penetrating exam
ination of the spoken or written word might thus reveal the more
latent, possibly unconscious structure that lies beneath, structure
that may serve as the ultimate basis for human understanding it
self. In this view, for example, Levi-Strauss (1963) has proposed
that wide-ranging cultural forms and artifacts can be traced to a
fundamental binary logic. Chomsky (1968) has attempted to locate
a “deep” grammatical structure from which all well-formed sen
tences may be derived. Lacan’s persistent concern (1978) has been
with the structural features of the layers of the mind.
In spite of the immense and optimistic challenge furnished by
the structuralist movement, mounting criticism combined with the
steady accumulation of competing accounts of the “hidden struc
tures” have left the movement crippled. For one, the hermeneuticist writings of Gadamer (1975) and Ricoeur (1974) may be singled
out for their debilitating implications. As argued by Gadamer, the
interpretation of texts (i.e., the apprehension of underlying mean
ing) is largely dependent on historically situated conventions. Thus
what a text “means” can only be determined within the contempo
rary “horizon of understanding.” Whether this understanding co
incides with that of the initial author is essentially indeterminant.
Although differing from Gadamer in important respects, Ricoeur
echoes this concern in his argument that texts serve as means of
“opening up” possible existences. Interpreting a person’s words is
not a matter of determining with clarity their precise underlying
structure. Rather, words have a social career that escapes the finite
horizon lived by the writer. The critical implications of this line of
reasoning for structuralist thought are clear enough: to the extent
that interpretations of the “underlying realm” are dependent on
historically based conventions, such interpretations give more in
sight into contemporary practices of accounting than they do into
underlying structure. Or, to put it another way, the constraints
over what may be said about such underlying structures are not
furnished by the structures themselves so much as they are by the
acceptable practices of rendering interpretation.
These implications are amplified in the works of deconstruc-
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tionist writers such as Derrida (1977), Hartman (1975), and deMan
(1979). Here the recurrent concern is with the literary figures
(tropes, metaphors, and other rhetorical stratagems) that dominate
the process of interpretation. If one chooses to interpret or de
scribe, such interpretations must abide by the rules governing in
terpretation itself. As certain literary forms are selected and others
abandoned, not only will the resultant work (whether literary, phil
osophic, or scientific) be delimited, but the object of interpretation
will be deconstructed. Thus, in adopting a given literary form, the
form itself comes to dominate description in a way that obliterates
or masks from view the object of description. If one attempts to
interpret the “underlying intention” of a given author (or actor),
the literary form intrinsic to interpretation itself will obscure and
replace the object of concern. In Derrida’s terms, “II n’y a pas de
hors texte” (There is nothing outside the text). Or to bring the
matter closer to home, behavioral description possesses an automy
of its own. Once a descriptive form is adopted, it carries on an
independent existence and the referential implications are ob
scured. For example, to use the metaphor of the computer to “de
scribe” mental functioning is to restrain the descriptive enterprise
in significant ways. Concepts of creativity, imagination, and uncon
scious cease to be matters of major concern. In effect, once the
metaphor has been selected, the actual processes at stake are
circumscribed. Whatever their properties, they will be replaced by
constituents of the metaphor.
Behavioral scientists have increasingly come to share these con
cerns with the figurative basis of theoretical-accounts (cf. Leary, in
press; Sampson 1983). In particular, a keen interest has developed
in recent years over the dominant metaphors guiding theoretical
construction in psychology. Much of this discussion has been in
spired by Pepper’s analysis (1972) of world hypotheses. Following
Pepper, many analysts have criticized mainstream psychology of
the present century for its virtually exclusive reliance on a mecha
nistic metaphor (Hollis 1977; Shotter 1975). Such criticisms often
revolve around issues of the value biases implicit in the metaphor.
However, from the present perspective, we see that once a theorist
is committed to the metaphor of the human as machine, the partic
ular activities of the person cease to play a central role in the pro
cess of theoretical description and explanation. Regardless of the
character of the person’s behavior, the mechanist theorist is vir
tually obliged to segment him from the environment, to view the
environment in terms of stimulus or input elements, to view the
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person as reactive to and dependent on these input elements, to
view the domain of the mental as structured (constituted of in
teracting elements), to segment behavior into units that can be co
ordinated to the stimulus inputs, and so on. Other metaphors exist
as alternatives to the mechanistic. For example, the organismic, the
marketplace, the dramaturgical, and the rule-following metaphors
have all played a significant role in psychological research of the
past decades (see Overton & Reese 1973; Thibaut & Kelley 1959;
Sarbin & Scheibe 1983; and Harre & Secord 1972). Each carries
with it certain advantages and limitations, each commits itself to
certain value positions, and, most important for present purposes,
each acts so as to imply an ontology. Once the terms of this on
tology are explicated, the precise actions of the individual so “de
scribed” cease to be significant. They primarily serve to set the
context for exercising the favored metaphor.
From Action to Linguistic Autonomy

Although thinkers in the deconstructionist vein furnish an indirect
threat to assumptions of semantic mapping, one final line of argu
ment must be considered. In this case, a principled challenge is
launched more directly against the relationship between word and
entity. To appreciate the force of this challenge, we must turn the
clock back to late nineteenth-century Germany and the intense de
bate over the character of the specifically human sciences {Geistenwissenschaften) as opposed to the natural sciences {Naturwissenschaften). Dilthey, Weber, Rickert, and many others argued that the
study of human behavior was centrally concerned, not with the ob
jectivity given behavior of persons, but with the underlying mean
ing of behavior to persons. The understanding of human conduct
thus required a penetration into the subjective life of individuals,
into their intentions, motives, and reasons. A similar line of argu
ment was later adopted by Collingwood in his characterization of
historical study: “Unlike the natural scientist, the historian is not
concerned with events as such at all. He is concerned with those
events which are the outward expression of thoughts and is only
concerned with these so far as they express throughts” (1946, 217).
Peter Winch’s influential The Idea of a Social Science (1958) elabo
rates further on this thesis. As Winch maintains, the objects of nat
ural science study have an existence independent of the concepts
used to understand them. However, in the case of human action,
the concepts of understanding essentially establish the ontological
foundations. For example, the occurrence of something that we
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term “claps of thunder” is independent of the concept of thunder;
however, in the case of human action, without a concept of “com
mand” or “obedience,” such “events” simply do not exist.
This thinking wends its way into contemporary study in the
form of antibehaviorist thinking. Most important in this instance,
Charles Taylor (1964), among others, has distinguished between
human behavior (bodily movements caused by forces or elements
over which the individual has no control) and human action (move
ments of the body resulting from intentionality or reasons).
Human study, on this account, is not principally concerned with
the former (such as the velocity of a free-falling human body), but
is vitally absorbed with the latter. The understanding of human
action requires that one take into account the precipitating reasons
(motives, intentions), and most of our terms for describing human
conduct are essentially wedded to the assumption of underlying
reasons or intentions. That is, when an individual is described as
aggressive, the assumption follows that he or she must have
intended to be so. If one had no such intention, then the descriptor
would simply be inappropriate. In the same way, the logic of our
language does not permit us to say that one “reads a book,” “writes
a speech,” “takes a plane to Chicago,” or even “criticizes others”
without any intention of doing so. In effect, the common language
is a language of reasons rather than causes.
The argument that the language for describing human conduct
is largely an intentional one is broadly compelling. A rationale for
why such language is required is spelled out elsewhere (Gergen
1982). However, in the present context, we must inquire into the
implications of this view for the problem of semantic linkages. Es
sentially we find ourselves in the following condition: The lan
guage of person description is not linked to, defined by, nor does it
refer to spatiotemporal particulars as such. Rather, its referents
seem largely to be psychological conditions (intentions, meanings,
motives, etc.). When we speak of a person being aggressive, help
ful, obedient, conforming, and the like, we are speaking, not of the
overt movements of the body, but of psychic dispositions. Yet if this
conclusion is accepted, we then confront the problem of grounding
the semantic linkage between person description and psychological
state. How is one to recognize the occurrence of one form of inten
tion or motive as opposed to another?
A variety of answers to this question have been posed over the
centuries, and there is simply not space and time enough for a
review of these proposals and their difficulties. However, that

148

Kenneth J. Gergen

there are difficulties has become most apparent in recent her
meneutic debate. The problem is generally cast in terms of ac
curacy of interpretation. When confronted with competing
accounts of the interpretation of a text, how are judgments to be
rendered regarding relative accuracy? How can one interpretation
be judged as “missing the author’s point” (meaning, intention) and
another deemed accurate? Again, attempts have been made to an
swer this question positively (Habermas 1983; Hirsch 1967), but
none of these arguments has yet commanded broad agreement.
Furthermore, the specter of cultural and historical relativism re
mains robust. We have already touched on the work of Gadamer
and Ricoeur in this respect.
In my view, there are principled reasons for indeterminacy of
interpretation. In particular, it appears that all attempts to clarify
or determine with accuracy the intent of a given action are subject
to infinite regression. As we have seen, behaviors are indexed by
intentional language (e.g., aggression, dominance, helpfulness). In
effect, the label commits one to assumptions about a psychological
state that is not itself made transparent by the movements of the
body. If clarification is then desired concerning the actual motive
or intention, we must rely on other behavioral indicators (e.g., ut
terances, movements). Yet the description of these indicators is
subject to the same problem as the initial interpretation; the de
scriptor commits one to still further assumptions about psychologi
cal dispositions. For example, interpreting a given action (e.g.,
delivering shock to another subject) as aggression, is in itself with
out objective warrant. The experimenter does not truly know what
the subject was intending when he pressed his fingers on the but
ton. For clarification, the subject might then be asked what he was
“trying” to do. Yet his utterance (e.g., “He had it coming”) itself
stands in need of interpretation (are these words expressing anger,
moral duty, a need for reciprocation, a need to fulfill the experi
menter’s expectation?). Whatever conclusion is drawn rests on the
same quicksand as the initial interpretation. It commits one to yet
another objectively unwarranted conclusion, as would all further
attempts to clarify or “shed further light” through observation.
This analysis leaves us confronting the possibility that the lan
guage of person description (and explanation) is generated, elabo
rated, extended, or cast aside in relative independence of the
activities it is designed to describe. In principle, its life is essentially
autonomous from and orthogonal to the life for which it accounts.
This is not to say that we cannot reach agreement (even rapidly)
regarding the adequacy of behavioral description. Rather, it is to
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venture that adequacy in description is not engendered by the
character of the acts in question but by the exigencies of social prac
tice. For example, we may readily agree that a person is “dominat
ing a conversation,” but with the proper negotiation of terms, the
same actions could be viewed as “submissive,” “loving,” “inquir
ing,” “lazy,” and so on. The necessity of shifting from one descrip
tion to another does not derive from the character of the actions
themselves; the actions are identical across descriptions. Rather,
they depend on the skills or abilities of the interlocutors to navigate
successfully the existing language conventions.
Given the relative autonomy of descriptive activity, the way is
open for considering the origins, forms, potentials, and per
vasiveness of accounting practices. In effect, one is sensitized to the
possibilities for ethnographic analyses of person description (ethnopsychology, ethnosociology, etc.) with reflexive ramifications for
the relevant disciplines. Such work is already well underway in an
thropology and cross-cultural psychology. Analyses have focused,
not only on the particular system of psychological description in
various primitive cultures (Heelas & Lock 1981; Lutz 1982), but as
well on potential generalities across cultures (cf. Shweder &
Bourne 1982; White 1980). The implications of such work also play
a critically reflexive role for the behavioral scientist. For example,
concerted inquiry has demonstrated how common linguistic con
ventions can serve to fashion what are taken to be scientific facts
about personality (Shweder & D’Andrade 1980; Shweder 1982). Of
more general significance, recent attempts have been made toward
systematizing the common-sense suppositions upon which all such
knowledge must be grounded if one is to “make sense” (and not
“nonsense”) within contemporary Western culture. In this regard,
Smedslund (1978) has attempted to isolate common-sense the
orems that underlie psychological theories such as social learning
theory. Ossorio (1978) has outlined a discrete set of parameters
that appear to guide the description of persons. My own attempt
(Gergen 1984) has been to demonstrate that virtually all that may
be said about a given activity (e.g., “aggression”) is already given in
the linguistic rules governing the terms in question. Through a
procedural unpacking process, it is possible to elucidate the gram
matical scaffolding.
Descriptive Language: Constrained and Free

This analysis has explored four contemporary threats to the kinds
of dependencies on semantic languages required for a progressive,
empirically based science. Let us consider their implications for the
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possibility of observational constraints over description and then
move to examine the implications for the future of the sociobehavioral sciences.
The contextualist arguments hold that descriptions of the world
are in themselves uninformative about the nature of things. Such
descriptions may be constrained by observation, but a continuous
process of ostensive grounding is necessitated as environmental
and linguistic circumstances are altered. The same descriptive term
may have multiple referents (or none at all) depending on what
language game one is playing at a given time. So long as one is
committed to a particular game, then, a certain degree of con
straint or “objective meaning” is possible. From the scientific per
spective, observation may thus play an important role in the
constraining of theory; however, its constraining power is lodged
within social process. Within particular scientific subcultures at spe
cific periods, localized agreement over concept application (“what
counts as what”) can be reached, and this does seem to be the case
for most natural science explanation (see Campbell, chap. 5, this
volume, for a discussion of the social processes generating such
agreements).
From the constructionist vantage point, we find that descriptive
languages are not derived from observation; rather, such lan
guages operate as the lenses or filters through which we determine
what counts as an object. As argued, it is problematic to extend the
metaphor of the lens to the domain of perception. The argument
that language determines the way events are registered on the
senses is badly flawed. It seems more promising to argue that the
forestructure of the descriptive language will have a strong deter
mining effect on the account to be rendered of the world. What
ever one’s observations, they must be recreated within the sense
making devices at our disposal. Thus it is not the observation that
produces the chief constraint over description; it is the form of
descriptive discourse itself that constrains. The origins of these
forms may, again, be traced to the sphere of social interchange. Is
this to obviate fully the process of systematic observation within the
sciences? It would not appear so. So long as it is possible for scien
tists to agree on how to employ the filter or the lens in a given
setting, then it should be possible for observed variations to correct
or sustain a given theory. If what we term measures of “the earth’s
rotation” were to undergo rapid change, certain questions would
undoubtedly be raised concerning current astronomical theorizing.
The conventions of discourse might determine how sense was
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made. Nevertheless, the constructed events could then stand as a
goad to theoretical activity.
Much the same result emerges when we take into account the
deconstructionist orientation. Here it may be argued that scientific
description is strongly infiuenced by the linguistic figures (meta
phors, tropes, etc.) selected for communication. Once the figure
has been selected (and it is unclear how such determination could
be induced from observation), certain descriptive practices are vir
tually required. The language itself functions continuously without
dependence on the particulars of the world to be described. Yet
observational constraint can be secured in much the same way as in
the contextualist and constructionist cases. Localized social agree
ments can be reached regarding the proper metaphor or other lit
erary figure to apply to certain observable events. Once such
semantic linkages are conventionalized, then observation may in
form one as to when the figure is relevant, correct, or inaccurate,
and when it is not. In the same way, mathematical systems possess
their own internal logic; yet once agreement is reached over how
various mathematical integers index various observables (e.g., what
counts as “three” as opposed to “four” entities), there may be little
subsequent ambiguity over applying this system to events. For all of
these arguments, then, we may surely agree with Quine’s conten
tion that scientific theory is grossly underdetermined with respect
to observation; and we may agree with Kuhn that what we term
advances in science are highly dependent on social negotiation
practices among scientists. Yet when lodged within certain social
practices, empirical observations do retain at least the capacity to
constrain theoretical description.
It is the fourth line of argument, which stresses the language of
action, that poses the most radical challenge to traditional corre
spondence views. In this case, we find that terms of behavioral de
scription cannot in principle be linked in a definitional sense to
observed patterns of human activity. By and large, the language of
human action simply has no recognizable spatiotemporal coordi
nates. Nor, given the practical obstacles to cementing static, lin
guistic integers to an ever-changing pattern, does such an outcome
seem possible. Theoretical description and explanation may thus
proceed in relative independence of behavioral observation. This
latter threat to semantic linkage may also demarcate the study of
human action from the study of many natural phenomena. Al
though language conventions in both domains enjoy far greater
autonomy than suggested by early correspondence enthusiasts, it
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does seem possible through social practice to link language and
observation in the natural science case in a way that does not seem
possible in the case of human action.
As we thus see, traditional empiricist and postempiricist ac
counts of behavioral science practices are placed in severe jeopar
dy. The present arguments suggest that the assiduous application
of empirical method, combined with sophisticated logic, will not
yield the kind of knowledge of human affairs optimistically prom
ised in various logical empiricist (and critical rationalist) writings.
Such systems of understanding would not appear to be derived
from, guided by, or ultimately corrected by the world of observa
tion. They seem quintessentially products of human interaction—
communal artifacts, the major functions of which must be traced to
their function within a social process. For the traditional empiricist
or the security-seeking scientist, such conclusions will be found pes
simistic, even nihilistic. However, they are so only if one remains
glued to past conceptions of the scientific enterprise. When prop
erly extended, this line of argument suggests that the potential of
sociobehavioral study has scarcely been tapped. This study may be
of enormous consequence to society, but traditional scientific prac
tices of the craft have virtually ensured that its potential will not be
realized.
Whither the Science of Human Action?

To appreciate the unrealized potential of behavioral inquiry, it is
useful to return to Austin’s concept of performative utterances
(1962), that is, utterances that do not describe or report anything
about the world, that can neither be verified or falsified, but that
themselves constitute significant forms of social action. For exam
ple, utterances such as “I vow,” “I promise,” or “I am obligated”
are not reports on real-world states of affairs. However, they often
play an immensely important role in social affairs. In a major sense,
the forms of theoretical description and understanding generated
within the sociobehavioral sciences may be considered per
formative in character. They appear to describe events in the real
world, but closer examination reveals no spatiotemporal coordi
nates. Nevertheless, such descriptions are integral to the broader
social process in which the sciences are embedded. Scientific expla
nations and descriptions serve in the same way as “vows,” “prom
ises,” and other performatives. They operate as actions with
significant social consequences. Again in Austin’s terms, they carry
with them a considerable degree of “illocutionary force,” that is.
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the capacity to invoke patterns of social action. We must, then, con
sider the performative uses to which language is put within the
culture. As the inventors, purveyors, and elaborators of lan
guage—and specifically, languages about people—the sociobehavioral scientists can serve a critical role within the culture, both
intellectual and societal. Three of these functions deserve special
attention. In each case, we will consider the implications for the
field of mental health, a focal domain throughout this volume.
Societal Reproduction and Transformation
For human populations, language constitutes perhaps the major
form of communal or coordinated social action. When people are
actively engaged in linguistic interchange, they are carrying out
intricate interdependent activities—much like dancing or fencing.
Further, because language is used to “describe” or explain people’s
internal states (e.g., intentions, affects, plans), it is a major vehicle
of social influence. The description of a people’s internal states
may dramatically alter others’ actions toward them—including the
giving and taking of life. To attribute a person’s failure to his “mo
tivation” has far different implications than pointing to his lack of
genetic endowment; to attribute achievement to motives of selfaggrandizement is to imply a different treatment of the actor than
to see such achievement as an act of altruism; to say that a killing
was accompanied by “malice aforethought” is to threaten the ac
tor’s life in a way that an attribution of temporary insanity would
not. As language users with a high degree of visibility in the
culture, sociobehavioral scientists are positioned to have enormous
influence on the dominant theories of society and thus on its social
patterns and institutions.
In recent years, critics of the science have become increasingly
concerned over such influences. As they have pointed out, the sci
ences treat their descriptions and explanations as if they were neu
tral accounts of the facts. Yet they are far from neutral in their
effects. As Gouldner (1970) has shown, for example, structuralfunctional theory in sociology serves to maintain the existing state
of society’s major institutions. It favors the status quo and militates
against revolution. Social change agents are, within its framework,
to be distrusted. Similarly, mechanistic accounts of human activity,
because of the emphasis placed on manipulation of environmental
stimuli, tend to favor those who have the power in society to control
these stimuli (Argyris 1975). Most psychological theory, with its ex
planatory focus on the internal workings of mind, places the blame
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for undesirable actions (crime, unemployment, drug consumption)
on the individual. Theories holding “principled decision making”
superior in moral matters implicitly favor a male-dominated
culture (Gilligan 1982). Women, as it is said, prefer a more con
textually based form of moral decision making. Many additional
examples could be supplied.
Most existing analyses of the implicit value biases of scientific
theory have taken the scientist to task for such biases. The scientist
is criticized for masking “ought” statements, or visions of the good,
behind seemingly neutral descriptions. My arguments do not de
tract from the importance of these attacks. However, it is also clear
that the theorists who are attacked are not misguided in their ex
pression of value commitments. They can do little else. If they can
be blamed at all, it is perhaps for their failure to appreciate the
significance of such commitments. Rather than searching for
means of cleansing scientific discourse from prescriptive implica
tion (which itself would act as a process of mystification), scientists
should seek to gain as much sophistication as possible regarding
the forms of descriptive and explanatory discourse that will best
enable them to achieve their valued goals for society. They should
improve their skills in creating “images of the good” rather than
seeking escape.
The present arguments also give special importance to the sci
ences as forces for societal transformation. Not only can the under
standings developed and disseminated by the sciences re-create (or
destroy) social organization, they may also help to transform that
organization. For example, implicit in each of the above critiques is
a vision of alternative social arrangements (change as opposed to
the status quo, a redistribution of power, communal institutions,
etc.). These implicit commitments carry the same prescriptive sig
nificance as the theories under attack. To attack a theory for its
support of the status quo is to favor forms of change. To criticize
forms of explanation for their bias toward person-blame is to si
multaneously suggest that systems, not persons, are generic causes.
However, it also seems clear that criticism of existing understand
ings is only one means of using the science to transform the
culture. Theories may insinuate themselves into social life in other
ways as well. For one, various social groups whom scientists believe
to be disenfranchised or oppressed may require the kinds of lan
guage forms that would give them a sense of unity and rationale
for collective action. It is this sort of theoretical work in which
Marxist theorists have often excelled and that today has galvanzied
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the feminist movement into a vital social force. In addition to cri
tique and the articulation of rationales, the scientists may also per
ceive a need for theoretical accounts that can favor certain forms of
institution more generally. For example, critics may be justified in
attacking the individualistic bias of psychological theory. However,
there remains the difficult task of creating descriptive and explana
tory forms that would render communitarianism both intelligible
and desirable.
What implications does this line of reasoning have for inquiry
into mental health? At the outset, it is clear that prevailing theories
of mental illness and health have been of enormous social conse
quence within the culture. The incarceration of non-normal per
sons within this country has depended in large measure on the
pervasive ethnopsychology. That is, if the non-normal are viewed
as “ill,” “unreasonable,” “controlled by unconscious and uncon
trollable forces,” then locked wards seem reasonable. If the same
symptoms are explained in terms of normal psychological fu*nctioning, reasonable and functional within their context and under
voluntary and socially accessible control, then forced segregation is
injurious if not immoral. In most cases, theories of mental or emo
tional well-being are transparent prescriptions for the good life.
However, theorists in this domain seldom seem self-reflexive in
these pronouncements. Images of the good are made to appear as
by-products of careful empirical inquiry. In this sense, almost all
such accounts are not only designed to mystify, but they lack
thoughtful appraisal of the potential assets and liabilities of the
kinds of ideal types championed by the theories. An important goal
for future theoretical work in the mental health arena is the devel
opment of probing rationale for the kinds of action patterns and
social institutions that may be achieved through favored theoretical
positions.
Critique and the Transcendence of Ontology
Mention has been made of the use of critique within the sciences
for purposes of social transformation. However, there is a second
and less ideologically restricted sense in which critique should come
to occupy a central role within the sciences. In this case, critique
serves as a major means of escaping the strangulating effects of
one-dimensional ontologies. As we have seen, descriptions of per
sons may be elaborated, extended, or abandoned without regard to
the actual activity of persons to which they have putative reference.
Yet despite its lack of spatiotemporal coordinates, the language is
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deployed as a referential device. As the descriptive language is put
into action, the interlocutors make an implicit commitment to a
world of events that is independent of the language. Simultaneous
to language use is its objectification; an ontology of intangibles is
created. As an inadvertent by-product of communication, a power
ful world of impalpable particulars springs to life.
Required, then, is a process whereby the science can continu
ously demystify the realities it serves to create. The scientist is invit
ed to carry out the kind of intellectual work that will enable the
culture to transcend the pervasive ontology of the time, to reach
beyond and to appreciate both the advantages and shortcomings of
the dominant world view. As Stolzenberg has proposed in the case
of mathematics, “We need to adopt an activist policy concerning
the invention and following of procedures that entail the undoing
of accepted beliefs and habits of thought; and we ought to regard
the invention of such procedures as one of the fundamental means
by which scientific knowledge may be increased” (1978, 229). The
process of person description seems virtually inevitable; indeed
such description serves many valuable functions in social life. As we
have seen, the scientist can enrich and potentiate that language.
However, because any tool constrains as it liberates, the scientist
seems optimally positioned to monitor, critique, and cast necessary
doubt on the use of his own implements.
Within the mental health domain, this kind of critique has de
manded a certain degree of attention. Particularly in regard to psy
chotherapeutic aims and techniques, a keen, self-conscious attitude
has developed. Much less has been done to monitor the hidden
agendas underlying diagnostic, mensurational, and experimental
psychopathology research programs. What does the most recent
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychi
atric Association (DSM-3) tell us about contemporary culture and the
valuational commitments of its authors? What social patterns are
favored by tests that place a strong value on believing one controls
one’s own outcomes, living under low stress, or being cognitively
differentiated? If research results are interpreted in such a way
that biological as opposed to cognitive processes are held primarily
responsible for schizophrenia, what are the likely repercussions for
institutions of family, school, and treatment centers? Such analyses
should become a normal part of the research process, ideally pre
ceding rather than following the mounting of large-scale research
programs.
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Enhancing Symbolic Resources
One may justifiably lament the loss of security implicit in this analy
sis. The belief that theoretical systems may be corrected through
observation has been a long-standing source of optimism in the
sociobehavioral sciences. Yet I do not simultaneously disparage the
companionate conception of scientific progress. Advancement in
the understanding of human conduct, not only is a possibility with
in the present framework, but may indeed be considered a central
concern of scientific work. Such progress derives from the develop
ment and elaboration of conceptual systems. In their performative
capacity, concepts of human conduct operate much as tools for car
rying out relationships. Any given set of tools both enables and
constrains. It facilitates certain lines of action while restricting oth
ers. Advancement in understanding largely derives, then, from the
development of new forms of discourse. With the emergence of
new language frames, the potential for effective human action is
augmented. To view social life as an exchange of reinforcements is
both fascinating and rich in evocative potential—but ultimately de
limited. Greater efficacy can be achieved if one has at one’s disposal
lenses through which social life may be seen as sets of rituals, the
atrical presentations, economically determined patterns, power dy
namics, dialectic transformations, and so on. In effect, the socio
behavioral sciences stand in an optimal position to contribute to the
symbolic resources of the culture.
This contribution may be best served by what I have termed
“generative theory,’’ that is, theoretical views that are lodged
against or contradict the taken-for-granted world of daily life
(whether within the sciences or without) .and that open new vistas
of intelligibility (Gergen 1978b). As any given theoretical system is
elaborated and its general intelligiblity is increased, it becomes ob
jectified. It acquires the mystique of real-world representation.
The invitation to sustain such common-sense formulations is vir
tually irresistable; failure to do so risks ridicule and social isolation.
Yet it is just this mantle of apparent madness that must be donned
if conceptual progress is to be achieved. In effect, some of the
greatest conceptual strides are to be made when the theorist can
bracket the accepted realities and fumble toward the articulation of
the absurd. It is precisely this capacity that elevates the work of
such theorists as Freud, Jung, Skinner, and Goffman. Each has
succeeded, in varying degrees, to make uncommon sense.
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In terms of future inquiry in the mental health domain, a special
premium is to be placed on such generative theorizing. For exam
ple, the most popular theories of depression today trace its roots to
environmental causes (e.g., uncontrollable circumstances and es
teem-lowering communications). In this sense, depression appears
to be an inescapable, innately determined reaction to particular
events in the world. Such theories feed the common belief that
people are victims of depression much as they are victims of war or
earthquakes. A generative theory in this case might be one that
reframed depression as a voluntary act over which people could
exert control if they so desired. Rather than a society of victims,
one might thus help to create a culture in which depressions were
voluntarily used (or not) by people to serve their ends. Many other
forms of “mental illness” are similar to depression in their mecha
nistic structures and are equally ripe for unseating. (See Shweder’s
essay, chap. 7 this volume, for further discussion of mental health
theory and the creation of culture.)
The status of empirical work in the development of fundamen
tal understanding is clearly diminished by this account. Rather
than furnishing a warrant for theoretical statements, as traditional
science would have it, such work largely serves a rhetorical func
tion. It becomes a means for enhancing the objectification process.
In particular, it enables the scientist to translate the abstract and
typically rarefied language of the theoretical account into a more
general or lay language (the language of methodology and scien
tific procedure) and thereby increase the intelligibility of the for
mer. Research thus continues to serve an important function, but
one that is quite secondary to the development of symbolic re
sources. There are other than rhetorical functions for empirical
research. Particularly in the field of mental health, there may be a
special need for certain kinds of actuarial prediction. Ascertaining
the number of persons seeking therapeutic help, using heavy
amounts of debilitating drugs, taking their lives, seeking divorce,
experiencing rape or physical abuse, and so on, along with studies
of major predictors, could do much to improve mental health pol
icies and services. The attempt in this case is, not the objectification
of theory, but merely the kind of counting and prediction that
makes for more effective utilization of physical resources.
Summary

This chapter attempted, first, to examine several lines of argument
that together pose a major threat to the belief that precise linkages
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can be forged between theories and evidence, propositions and
particulars, or words and things. This analysis suggests that what
ever the relation between these domains, it is both ambiguous and
dependent on social convention. Further, in the case of describing
human action, we confront the possibility that theory is fundamen
tally closed to empirical evaluation. Within this context, we then
examined the possibilities for a positive program in the social sci
ences. It was proposed that the sciences chiefly be viewed as sources
of intelligibility or vehicles for the conceptual construction of real
ity. From this vantage point, the sciences can play a pivotal role in
transforming or sustaining patterns of social conduct. Further,
there is a critical need for conceptual work that can enable people
to transcend or escape the taken-for-granted realities in which they
are often enmeshed. In effect, the social sciences can make an im
measurable contribution to the symbolic resources of the culture.
This is a challenge that traditional empiricist epistemology has
largely obscured; it is also a challenge of immense and exciting
proportion.
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